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Venezuela is experiencing a transitional political process in which the 
government and the majority of Venezuelans want to move from a 
capitalist representative democracy to a more socialist participatory 
democracy. This transition is enmeshed in complexities, contradictions, 
and political opposition. Reflection on the experience of accompanying 
neighborhood groups in local decision making in Caracas from 2002 to 
2006 suggests that planning practitioners and scholars can be allies in 
the grassroots processes of empowerment and self-determination of 
local communities and advocates and active agents in the “trickling-up” 
of greater planning participation to upper levels of government.  
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The current government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, led by 
President Hugo Chávez, has initiated a transitional political process that 
is attempting to transform the inherited bureaucratic governance 
structure into a participatory socialist democracy. During the 40 years 
since 1959, from the revocation of a dictatorship to the beginning of 
Hugo Chávez’s tenure as president in 1999, Venezuela was a 
representative democracy, albeit a bureaucratic state in the service of 
capitalist upper-class interests. The governing and economic elites’ 
power came from the maintenance of the status quo, but their legitimacy 
was undermined as a large majority of Venezuelans entered the ranks of 
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the poor after 1983.  
 
In the current transition, grassroots people’s power exercised by local 
community organizations is being supported by the new national 
government as essential. Community organizing is not limited to the 
political process
1
 but an essential element of the current political project, 
buttressed and institutionalized by two key legal instruments: the 
National Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela—written 
by a constituent assembly and voted on by Venezuelan citizens in 
1999
2
—and the Local Planning Councils Law of 2002. The latter 
recognizes the participation of local organizations in public decision 
making as the “very root” of a “protagonist” participatory democracy. 
Chávez’s regime is attempting to install a “revolutionary government” in 
which central state policies aim at the improvement of the conditions of 
the materially poor while acknowledging the importance of working 
upward from and with local communities.  
 
This transition is, however, enmeshed in complexities and 
contradictions. This paper seeks to reflect on current planning
3 
practices 
and to contribute to the development of a model of planning that can 
stimulate people’s power in this transition. The need for this shifting of 
power from centralized governments to grassroots communities has been 
amply discussed in the planning literature (see, e.g., Friedmann, 1992; 
Flusty, 2004; DeFilippis, 2004). In this article we focus on two issues 
that planning scholars and professionals should address if they are 
concerned with improving the conditions of the materially poor and the 
politically disenfranchised: (1) the challenges inherent in moving from 
representative to participatory democracy, including longer and more 
cumbersome processes of decision making, changing regulations, 
procedures, and organizational structures, and resistance from 
bureaucratic and economic agents opposed to the new regime, and (2) 
the challenge represented by the dominance of the traditional “rational-
planning” paradigm,
4 
which can work against the consolidation of 
people’s power and the political regime change sought by the 
government and its supporters.  
 
This article first discusses Venezuela’s transition to grassroots 
democracy, antecedents of public participation in the planning process, 
and the marriage of direct and representative democracy. Then it 
describes the current context set by the Venezuelan Constitution and the 
participatory democracy in which planning restructuring is taking shape. 
It goes on to present a framework for planning in a participatory 
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democracy based on action-research involvement in two community-
organizing and planning processes in Caracas from 2002 to 2006. 
Finally, it discusses the shortcomings and risks of the current system of 
community organizing and proposes a role for planners as allies in the 
grass-roots processes of empowerment and self-determination of local 
communities and as advocates and active agents in the “trickling-up” of 
greater planning participation to upper levels of government. Assertions 
about the challenges of community organizing are based on primary 
research on two case studies in Caracas and, although they are not 
necessarily generalizable to the experience of all community 
organizations in Venezuela, are supported by substantial anecdotal 
information from other cases in the capital and elsewhere in the country.  
 
VENEZUELA’S TRANSITION TO GRASSROOTS 
DEMOCRACY  
Venezuela’s transition to a more inclusive and direct democracy is but 
one example of the rising popular resistance to globalization and 
neoliberalism (Irazábal, 2008; Irazábal and Foley, 2008) that is 
developing to different degrees and at different paces in Latin American 
countries, including Paraguay, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Cuba. Greater social and 
ethnoracial justice within an increasing consciousness of the need for 
environmental sustainability and a new understanding of democracy are 
seen as dependent on the abandonment of neoliberalism as a 
development model (Harris, 2003; Irazábal, 2008; Irazábal and Foley, 
2008; Ellner, 2004). In the case of Venezuela, the popular democratic 
construction of what Chávez has called “twenty-first-century socialism” 
seeks a new form of socialism that avoids the authoritarianism and 
rigidity of the earlier autocratic communist regimes.
5 
Indeed, one of the 
main achievements of the Chávez government is to give people hope 
that a socialist alternative is possible (Ellner, 2001; 2002; Lander, 2005; 
Parker, 2005; Vanden, 2003), even though the particularities of it have 
yet to be defined and are the subject of great political contention (Ellner, 
2008). This is a particularly important achievement given the 
widespread pessimism of progressive political groups and intellectuals 
around the globe about the possibility of finding an alternative to 
neoliberalism and neoconservative imperialism (Harvey, 2005; Giroux, 
2004; Chomsky, 2003; Fuentes, 2004; see also Salinas Figueredo, 2007, 
and Suárez Salazar, 2007).
6  
 
A major challenge in this context, however, is the integration of a 
socialist economy into a predominantly capitalist context. These brands 
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of socialism aim to adapt to living with and having economic relations 
with the capitalist world (see Mészáros, 1995). Chávez and other leaders 
in Latin America argue that if meaningful social change with regard to 
the enormous social inequalities in the region is to happen, economic 
growth will need to “be subordinated to a democratic regime based on 
direct popular representation in territorial and productive units” (Petras 
and Veltmeyer, 2001, quoted in McLaren and Jaramillo, 2008: 15). 
Implicit in this vision is the notion that popular democracy needs to rise 
above the domination of top-down models of decision making in public 
administration. Planning is an important element to consider as an ally in 
this process.  
 
Thus, a conflictive, dialectical, and nonlinear process rather than a 
smooth, planned transition to socialism is taking place in Venezuela 
(Irazábal and Foley, 2008; Ellner, 2008). Experience in other socialist 
countries, such as Cuba, has indicated how difficult this can be, 
particularly in the early years of socialist transition, because of the need 
to confront serious economic crises and repel both internal resistance 
and external aggression. For some years after the 1959 revolution, Cuba 
followed a traditional socialist economic planning model in which local 
planning was dependent on national and regional economic plans with 
little participation of local communities. During the 1990s, this began to 
change—local planning was given more autonomy, and decision making 
was opened up to include the opinions of local communities— although 
challenges remain (González Núñez, 1995; Roman, 2003: 72). 
Additionally, the transition to a socialist regime is not necessarily linked 
with greater equality or more democracy. In the example of Cuba, for 
instance, Fidel Castro led a regime that combined significant social 
benefits in the health, education, economic, and agricultural fields with 
domination over decision making and a ruthless policy toward the 
capitalist class and others identified with the earlier regime. Although 
the pitfalls and controversial aspects of the Cuban Revolution have been 
used (and abused) as propaganda against the Venezuelan process, some 
critical distinctive features of the process in Venezuela are that the 
attempts to advance a transition to a socialist economy have not fully 
broken with existing capitalist interests, have been carried out 
democratically and nonviolently, and are accompanied by efforts to shift 
from a representative to a more direct democracy.  
 
ANTECEDENTS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING 
IN VENEZUELA  
In the 1980s, Venezuela participated in the wave of government 
decentralization that swept across Latin America. The Chávez 
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government that came to power in 1999 did not invent the concept of 
public participation in urban planning; that concept had already been 
formally incorporated into planning legislation beginning with Ley 
Orgánica de Ordenación Urbanística in 1987. That legislation required 
that the public be informed of decisions that had been made in order to 
give legitimacy to the process—equivalent to the degrees of 
“nonparticipation” or “tokenism” in Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) classical 
ladder of citizen participation. Other legal reforms were designed to give 
greater participation to local communities, but the process of 
decentralization and municipalization that followed stressed 
participation in representative rather than direct democracy. Some critics 
have considered these reforms part of the neoliberal agenda for Latin 
America, especially when they are introduced from outside or 
institutionalized and managed by national elites (Kohl, 2002; Vilas, 
1996). Their controversial effects have been seen in the division of the 
capital metropolis, Caracas, into five municipalities instead of the 
previous two. This spatial and jurisdictional fragmentation has divided 
the city into distinct class and racial enclaves. While the rationale for 
this was facilitating management, the largely unanticipated consequence 
was to consolidate some of these enclaves and to widen the 
socioeconomic gaps among them. Some of these enclaves group 
political forces that have shown a willingness to use undemocratic 
tactics to oppose the current national regime. In effect, the coup d’état of 
April 11, 2002, the illegal oil-industry stoppage later that year, and the 
public disturbances called guarimbas
7 
that occurred in 2003–2004 had 
politically destabilizing purposes and links to the newly created Chacao 
and Baruta municipalities (Irazábal and Foley, 2008; Lander and López-
Maya, 2005; López-Maya and Lander, 2004).  
 
At the same time, the democratization of the municipalities allowed the 
consolidation of popular participatory movements and governments. In 
the wider Latin American context, for example, it can be associated with 
the rise of Frente Amplio in Uruguay, the Partido dos Trabalhadores in 
Brazil, and Causa R in Venezuela, all popular sociopolitical movements 
that achieved power at different levels. Thus, although the main force for 
generating massive popular participation in Venezuela was the 
Bolivarian Revolution begun in 1998 with Chávez’s first election to the 
presidency, some significant experiences of a more inclusive process of 
community participation had been initiated years earlier. The most 
notable were those in Caracas’s Federal District during the mayoral term 
of Aristóbulo Istúriz (1992–1995) and in Ciudad Guayana during the 




being members of the Causa R party at the time.
9 
There, attempts were 
made to overcome the elite’s control of local government by 
encouraging popular participation (Harnecker, 2005 [1995]: 7) and 
creating the development of community-based decision-making 
(Angotti, 2001; Irazábal, 2004). But that transition is usually not easy. 
Representative democracy, characterized as government for the people, 
tends to engender passivity. Therefore, a transitional period of 
government with the people is usually required before reaching any 
substantive level of government by the people.  
 
Furthermore, the left-leaning local governments face two main problems 
within national governments in the wake of the application of neoliberal 
formulas: the withdrawal of the central state from its redistributional 
functions through social spending and the bureaucratic apparatus 
inherited by the progressive local governments, which in Uruguay and 
other Latin American nations has been described as an ungoverned 
monster (“un monstruo que camina solo”). In Venezuela after Chávez 
assumed the presidency, the central government was very active in 
social spending throughout the nation (SISOV, 2006; Monahan, 2005),
10 
but with the recent drop in oil prices sustaining the same level of social 
spending remains a challenge. Some critics argue that the central 
government’s role in social spending has been exaggerated or that the 
results are not commensurate with the level of spending (Rodríguez, 
2008; for a rebuttal, see Weisbrot, 2008). As for the second challenge, 
the bureaucratic “monster” rears its head and slows progress at all levels 
of government through corruption, mismanagement, and lack of 
professional capacity. Yet, the greatest effects of this monster have 
derived not so much from the inefficiency and large size of the 
bureaucratic apparatus as from sabotage by individuals within the 
system who are opposed to Chávez’s regime (Fuentes, 2005). An 
editorial in an alternative newspaper speaks of functionaries “who live 
off the government” but “oppose any change that involves the people” 
and “abort, delay, manipulate [any change desired by the regime], finally 
hiding it in the obscurity with their accomplices” (La Hojilla, November 
1, 2006).  
 
Marx, in The Civil War in France (2000 [1871]), warned of the danger 
of using institutions inherited from a state that acted as a political 
instrument for the maintenance of working-class exploitation. Inefficient 
and downright counteracting bureaucracy, however, is not restricted to 
the capitalist state; it tends to reproduce and spread in many types of 
political systems without adequate democratic controls. In the context of 
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modernity, Anthony Giddens (1990: 12) points out that not only 
capitalist relations of production but also processes of “organization of 
human activities in the shape of bureaucracy” prevail. Therefore a 
democratic socialist transition requires attention to power not only over 
the means of production but also over the management of bureaucracy. 
Specifically, in Venezuela, one of the problems of promoting direct 
democracy is the existence of a corps of functionaries who are 
accustomed to acting without popular participation and accountability 
and therefore resist and resent the proposed changes.  
 
THE MANDAT IMPÉRATIF: THE MARRIAGE OF DIRECT 
AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY  
The transition from a representative to a direct democratic system has to 
face the challenging coexistence of representative and direct operational 
modes as it tries to move toward a balance of the two. Getting rid of all 
traces of representative democracy is not desirable (Fung, 2004; Fung, 
Gastil, and Levine, 2005). Critics of representative government point to 
the poverty of direct political involvement when participation is limited 
to electoral voting (Roman, 2003: 13). Compounding this danger, 
elected representatives often receive personal privileges or economic 
benefits that tend to distinguish their life conditions from those of the 
people (15). Their principal aim can then become the maintenance of 
their personal privileges or those of the political party with which they 
are affiliated. Rather than being representatives of the public, they may 
favor their personal or party interests (17). Opposed to these practices, 
Rousseau and Marx defined truly representative government as a mandat 
impératif in which delegates are directly selected by the people, 
instructed about their wishes, and subject to recall if their mandate is not 
pursued. In this view, delegates are not expected to be professional 
politicians; rather, they are expected to maintain their normal functions 
in the community they represent, thus maintaining close ties to their 
constituents (as described in the case of Cuba by Roman [2003: 18]).  
In the new Constitution of Venezuela, there is a clear intention to 
promote direct participation associated with people’s power while 
maintaining representative government (República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela, 2000: Art. 62), and elected officials are subject to periodic 
recall (Art. 72). This hybrid form is given expression in the laws relating 
to local planning and communal councils. Nevertheless, critical tensions 
remain between representative and direct systems.  
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY  
The country’s model of participatory democracy is established in the 
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1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2000). A constituent assembly ensured the 
elaboration of a constitution that would serve as the base for the 
transition from a predominantly representative to a more participatory 
democracy while maintaining aspects of both. Participatory democracy 
is conceived in the context of social cooperation, solidarity, and co-
responsibility (Art. 4); and the people’s sovereignty is to be exercised 
directly (Art. 5). This direct democracy is defined more precisely in 
Article 62, which establishes a protagonist role for the community in the 
planning, implementation, and control of state intervention. It also 
makes the state, particularly at the local level, responsible for the 
creation of structures to facilitate participation. The constitution calls for 
the incorporation of the communities into organizations whose 
decisions, made in “citizen assemblies,” must be respected by the 
elected local authorities (Art. 70).  
 
Direct participation is particularly relevant at the municipal level, where 
the institution of the local planning council (Art. 182) places the balance 
of power in the hands of local organizations formed at the parish level (a 
subdivision of the municipality). Political organization at the parish level 
is considered vital, particularly in large municipalities where the local 
councils are still very distant from their communities. The organization, 
functions, and responsibilities of the local planning councils were 
determined by the Ley de Consejos de Planificación Local (República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2002), a key part of the establishment of a 
participatory democracy that would give the organized community a 
protagonist role in public decision making (FIDES, 2002: 2). 
Traditionally, the municipal authorities have been responsible for 
planning in their jurisdictions. Now local planning councils have the 
responsibility for developing and managing municipal plans. These 
councils have a majority representation of neighborhood groups and 
community service organizations in health, land ownership, education, 
etc. Authority is divided between elected representatives (the mayor, 
council members, and presidents of the parish councils) and those from 
local and neighborhood organizations. The mayor presides over the 
council, but local organizations have a voting majority of at least one. 
Local organization representatives are elected in community assemblies. 
In 2006, the Libertador Municipality in Caracas, for example, had 73 
members, 36 elected in the normal local electoral processes and 37 who 
represented local organizations. From the beginning, the functioning of 
these councils has faced difficulties because of their large size and the 
fact that local representatives are not paid while the formally elected 
representatives are. The situation is further complicated by the wide 
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range of functions for which delegates are responsable, from collecting 
basic information and developing plans and proposals to implementing 
projects.  
 
As can be appreciated, in theory this legislation transfers considerable 
power over decision making to the local communities, which become 
responsible for maintaining contact with local networks so that their 
interests will be taken into account and they will be informed about what 
is going on. In reality, however, they have not been given the necessary 
resources to achieve these tasks and are dependent on a “technical 
office” associated with the municipality. As a result, the control and 
oversight of decision making are still skewed in favor of professional 
public servants and state representatives.  
 
Because of the frustration caused by the slow pace of the process of 
democratization at the municipal level and, in some cases, the delay 
between the financing of municipal public works and their execution, 
President Chávez, in one of his weekly television broadcasts, declared 
that communal councils should be more independent of the municipal 
authorities and receive direct central government financing (Ellner, 
2009). He proposed the direct financing of communal councils—
subdivisions of parish and local planning councils
11
— from the national 
budget, bypassing municipal government.
12 
Although most municipal 
authorities talk about participatory democracy, they are often unwilling 
to relinquish their power over financial and managerial resources. Later, 
this process was formalized in the Ley de los Consejos Comunales 
(República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2006), which creates a virtually 
parallel system of local organization directly linked to the central 
government through the local Presidential Commission of Popular 
Power (Art. 20) and not, as traditionally, through the municipal 
authorities. It is an explicit step in the establishment of a people’s power 
structure as a counterweight to the representative national-regional-
municipal system.
13 
The intention is to foster people’s power over public 
policy making and implementation and generate projects that seek to 
satisfy communities’ needs and aspirations (Art. 2). A promotional 
committee, named in a citizens’ assembly, is responsible for the 
geographical delimitation of the communal councils. Councils should 
contain between 200 and 400 families in urban areas and upward of 20 
families in rural areas. All persons over 15 years old are considered 
potential voters (in the election of representatives) or representatives. 
Once legally formed, these councils can obtain up to 30,000 bolivares 
(almost US$14,000) to finance small productive or service projects in 
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the community (Rodríguez and Lerner, 2007). Less than a year after the 
law was passed (Lerner, 2007: 3), over 16,000 councils had already 
formed throughout the country. 12,000 of them had received funding for 
community projects—$1 billion total, out of a national budget of $53 
billion. The councils had established nearly 300 communal banks, which 
have received $70 million for micro-loans. The government plans to 
transfer another $4 billion in 2007. Thanks to these funds, the councils 
have implemented thousands of community projects, such as street 
pavings, sports fields, medical centers, and sewage and water systems.  
 
THE PLANNING CONTEXT  
The institutional initiatives just described are a reflection of the 
Venezuelan Constitution, in which there is an explicit reference to 
“participatory, democratic, and strategic planning with open 
consultation” (Art. 299) as the preferred approach. These normative 
intents, however, do not happen in a planning vacuum. In effect, two 
types of planning can be identified as influential in Venezuela in recent 
decades. The first is closely related to national/ regional economic 
planning and is influenced by the Comisión Económica para América 
Latina (Economic Commision for Latin America—CEPAL), founded in 
1948 (see Matus, 1978; 1984). In turn, CEPAL influenced scholars of 
the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (Center for Development 
Studies— CENDES), affiliated with the Central University of 
Venezuela. Planning theories of this type have been influential in the 
current government, especially under Jorge Giordani, appointed 
planning and development minister for 1999–2002 and several times 
thereafter. This approach is clearly linked to economic development 
planning with spatial strategies that aim, in the long term, for a more 
balanced distribution of activities and population in the national 
territory. An effort has been made to involve local (mainly institutional 
or political) actors, but planning is still dominated by a top-down 
approach from the central government. Its economic orientation and 
technical nature and its theoretical grounding create difficulties of 
communication with people engaged in local urban planning. The 
majority of these people are not formally trained as planners, and they 
regularly have well-defined spatial concerns with concrete problems in 
their local contexts and the participation of local actors.  
 
The second type of planning is associated with Etzioni’s (1967: 385) 
“mixed- scanning” approach, which combines  
(a) high-order, fundamental policy-making processes which set 
basic directions and (b) incremental ones which prepare for 
fundamental decisions and work them out after they have been 
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reached. . . . The flexibility of the different scanning levels 
makes mixed-scanning a useful strategy for decision-making in 
environments of varying stability and by actors with varying 
control and consensus-building capacities.  
 
This approach, which is considered an important influence on the 
“structural plans” introduced in the UK in 1968 (Cross and Bristow, 
1983: 237; Healey, 1983: 56), influenced the planning system introduced 
in Venezuela in 1987. Two levels of planning were established—one 
more general and supposedly strategic and the other more local and 
detailed. There were difficulties in separating the responsibilities for the 
two levels, and both tended to produce general land-use plans with little 
flexibility. 
 
These procedural models, inherited from the previous regime of 
representative democracy, continue to be applied in Venezuela. While 
some planning processes under these models may prove adaptable to the 
new requirements of participatory democracy, others may simply help 
reproduce the expert-driven processes and inequitable outcomes that the 
new democratic socialist regime seeks to avoid. In effect, a fundamental 
goal of the current government is to treat people’s participation as an 
integral part of governance. From the outset, planning in the current 
Venezuelan context is conceived as enmeshed in the processes of 
grassroots political organization and mobilization that are the very basis 
of participatory democracy. However, this is not easy to implement and 
may sometimes be counterproductive. Many observers (e.g., Fung, 
2004) argue that grassroots organizations ought to be outside the state so 
as to provide a mechanism of checks and balances. 
 
Currently, there is some confusion in Venezuela regarding the system of 
urban planning despite the introduction in 2005 of a new national 
planning law, which tends to reproduce the previous vertical system and 
does not fully incorporate community initiatives derived from the local 
planning, parish, and communal councils. Within this ambiguous 
planning climate, the “strategic choice” approach of Friend and Hickling 
(2002 [1997]), which proposes practical ways of approaching daunting 
problems, has become popular at various levels of decision making. The 
approach was endorsed in a 2004 television talk to the entire country by 





THE ROLE OF PLANNERS IN A SOCIALIST PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY  
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At the current political crossroads in Venezuela, the clear intention of 
the revolutionary government is to foster grassroots democracy. This is a 
great opportunity for progressive planners, but there are constant 
difficulties— inequitable conditions of communication, inequitable 
rewards for participants, professionals’ clings to expertise, ambiguities 
of the planning system, instability of planning networks, and 
deficiencies in capacity and management, to name a few.
15 
Despite these 
challenges, planners who sympathize with the progressive aims of the 
Chávez government may be able to seize the unprecedented 
opportunities made available to confront the obstacles and promote 
grassroots participation.  
 
In national/regional strategic planning, the planner’s role is still seen by 
bureaucrats and professionals as technical, often with the argument that 
major decisions are vital to national interests and cannot be left open to 
discussion. Obviously, critical areas such as national defense could be 
seen in this light, but there are others, for example related to the use of 
natural resources or community development strategies, that would 
benefit from more participatory democracy. Nevertheless, there is a 
tendency on the part of many public administrators and practitioners to 
underestimate the capacity of community groups to contribute to 
complex issues and to consider participation a risk to progress (Irazábal, 
2005; Irazábal and Eggebraten, 2006). Although the urgency to respond 
to critical needs is real, the rationales offered for circumventing 
participation demonstrate the difficulty of overcoming the notion that 
only the educated elite is prepared to run the affairs of the state and only 
planners are capable of planning.  
 
Matters become even more complicated when we realize that many 
professionals involved in planning in Venezuela do not support the 
political transition to an inclusive grassroots and socialist democracy 
advocated by Chávez’s regime. In fact, because the majority of 
Venezuelans are politically divided along the lines of class (Irazábal and 
Foley, 2008; Ellner, 2008) and a large number of planners come from 
the socioeconomic elite or identify with its values and fears (Foglesong, 
1986; Harvey, 1985), many of them oppose the current regime. 
However, under the justification of technical value-neutrality, 
professionals who oppose the government—some in nondemocratic 
ways, as demonstrated in their supporting of the 2002 coup d’état—still 
perform professional services for the current government. This condition 
presents ethical dilemmas much like those discussed by Ananya Roy 
(2005: 152) when she argues that “the provision and distribution of 
infrastructure is not a technical issue but rather a political process.” Roy 
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advocates a new epistemology for planning, one that “disrupts models of 
expertise, making it possible to generate knowledge about upgrading and 
infrastructure from a different set of experts: the residents.” Although 
some planners in Venezuela have indeed embraced the spirit of this new 
planning epistemology, not all of them have made the leap from 
knowledge to action (Friedmann, 1987). In addition, many practitioners 
still cling—consciously or unconsciously—to the idea that expertise is 
their exclusive possession and therefore do not value the knowledge of 
residents, their right to self-determination, or even the larger socialist 
political project currently in play. This stance has often led to resistance 
and active opposition to processes of planning by and with the people. 
 
Planning positions that problematize the notion of technical value-
neutrality suggest different orientations depending on the contextual 
circumstances and personal political and ethical beliefs of planners. 
There are approaches, such as the already mentioned strategic-choice, 
that make participation of local actors intrinsic to planning and stimulate 
learning by everyone involved (Forester, 1999; Innes, 2004; Booher and 
Innes, 2002; Friedmann, 1987; 1992). Although these approaches are 
compatible with participatory democracy, they do not seem to recognize 
the importance of the lasting organization of local groups that seek to 
stimulate more substantial change. There is a risk that only those who 
are contingently involved in the specific decision-making processes will 
benefit, and these processes may be short-lived if there is a high turnover 
of participants (Masters, 1995: 6). There is no doubt that such 
approaches could open up spaces in which alternative visions could be 
discussed, but certain critics consider that, far from being emancipatory, 
they may promote more effective top-down forms of organizational 
control (Cassell and Johnson, 2006: 785). Furthermore, these approaches 
tend to privelege the protagonist role of the planner as facilitator. The 
progressive planner, as described by Forester (1989), is a model that 
may open the possibility of a more appropriate role for planners in the 
Venezuelan context and others in which the objective is to expand 
participatory democracy. According to Forester, a progressive planner is 
one who works on the basis of Habermas’s “universal pragmatic 
standards of speech”— clarity, legitimacy, truth, and sincerity—and 
seeks to democratize planning processes by expanding the sphere in 
which undistorted and inclusive communication takes place. However, 
this model also maintains the planner at its center. It would seem 
especially effective for functionaries who work for government 
institutions and are confronted with practices that do not promote 




Finally, the model of the radical planner described by Friedmann (1987; 
1992) proposes that planners be protagonists in the process of societal 
transformation (Friedmann, 1987: 325; see also Beard, 2003; 2002; 
Friedmann, 1992; Holston, 1998; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; 
Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992). The radical role, however, is not 
possible within the state bureaucracy because, as Friedmann (1987: 389) 
says, planning has been integrated into the processes of political 
pacification that have been exercised by the bourgeois state. Therefore it 
is not enough to be aware of possible distortions or structures of elitist 
power (Irazábal, 2009); it is also necessary to unmask the ideological 
prejudices of existing practice (Roy, 2001; 2005; Harvey, 1985; 
Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002). This is possible only if planners heed 
Friedmann and Weaver’s (1979: 4) warning that they “cannot engage in 
planning without themselves becoming corrupted by power.” Here, we 
invoke again the new planning epistemology proposed by Roy, who 
argues that planners must learn to work with the increasingly frequent 
exceptions to the order of “formal” urbanization. She further suggests 
that this epistemology is useful not only in the context of developing 
nations, but in any context in which planners are concerned with 
redistributive justice (Roy, 2005: 147).  
 
In the current conjuncture in Venezuela, it is also necessary to call 
attention to the persistent warnings against putting too much confidence 
in the power of consensus (Irazábal, 2009; Foley and Lauria, 2000; 
Watson, 2006; Angotti, 2008). This confidence, influenced by a 
Habermasian universalism, tends to undervalue the fundamental 
differences in worldviews that are implicit in comfortable European-
centered or First World planning perspectives (Mészáros, 1989). As a 
result, it may obscure or even derail the development of social 
movements challenging hegemonic values (Roy, 2001; 2005; Watson, 
2006; Young, 1990; 1997; 2000; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b). Planners 
cannot assume that they are protected from contributing to this pitfall by 
their progressive values; as Healey (1997: 93) warns, they have to be 
constantly aware of the “deep structures of [elitist] power embedded in 
[their] ways of thinking and reasoning.”  
 
The alternative, then, is to associate with the social movements, which 
seek to seize political spaces in which they can develop a certain 
autonomy that improves their communities’ lives and economic well-
being. Friedmann (1987) sees the seed of state transformation in small-
scale initiatives, frequently around family groups. In his view, this 
transformation does not require either the “capture” of the state or the 
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“breaking down” of capitalism.  
 
These discourses are, he says, the empty diatribes of another century 
(1987: 342). Without denying the role of the state (Friedmann, 1992: 7), 
he sees the local community as the dynamo of alternative development 
(DeFilippis, 2004; Flusty, 2004)—a means for the liberation of the 
family from market dependency through cooperative development, 
agriculture, increase in self-sufficiency, and effective control of 
decision-making processes. We can draw parallels here with the aims of 
the present Venezuelan government. Additionally, Chávez in his 
speeches has increasingly stressed that the capitalist market cannot 
resolve the country’s problems. Instead, he is actively working on 
building alternative market relations (in Venezuela, within Latin 
America, and with other parts of the world) consisting of exchanges of 
goods, services, and technologies among developing communities and 
countries based on a sense of solidarity (an arrangement that even 




Friedmann (1987: 355) sees a specific role for planners as “part of the 
alternative, not as ‘consultants for hire’ but as committed partisans.” 
This is akin to the model of “advocacy planning” popularized by Paul 
Davidoff (1965; Harwood, 2003). This role is not easy to perform, 
however. Friedmann suggests that the planner should maintain a critical 
distance—not so distant as to create alienation from the community and 
not so involved as to lose the capacity for independent reasoning. This is 
the same dilemma as the problem of “going native” in qualitative 
research and one that has caused significant controversy in critical 
emancipatory action research (Masters, 1995) and feminist participatory 
action research (Fine and Torre, 2006). Supporting the community 
without being part of it presents distinct challenges and risks. In extreme 
situations, when the community is confronting violent state repression, 
for instance, where will the committed partisans be, and to what avail?
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Gramsci’s (1967: 24) criticism of intellectuals who consider themselves 
independent of the dominant class is pertinent here. He doubted that 
intellectuals formed as a function of the needs of capitalist production 
could align themselves with social forces that directly or indirectly 
questioned that system and argued that “organic intellectuals” emerging 
from their own communities were needed. Even though planners may 
subscribe to the idea of exchanging types of knowledge with community 
members, they should be mindful of risk of ultimately reproducing the 
same procedural and outcome-driven schemes of traditional professional 
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planning, which may not be those best suited to the conditions and needs 
of a given community.  
 
Despite all the challenges, however, radical planning—more recently 
theorized as “insurgent planning” as it confronts the tests produced by 
global neoliberal capitalism (Miraftab, 2006; 2009; Sandercock, 1998a; 
1998b; Friedmann, 2002; Miraftab and Wills, 2005)—seems particularly 
suitable for the current situation in Venezuela. Since its precepts are 
supported by the national constitution and government policies, it could 
conceivably be accommodated within governance dynamics that 
facilitate people’s direct participation. This is not to say that the other 
approaches discussed here do not have their benefits. Strategic choice, 
with its specific, pragmatic methods, and progressive planning, with its 
institutional planners working within the system, should be combined 
with insurgent planning as needed in the creative development of models 
that can respond to particular problems and processes. Whoever the 
actors, Miraftab (2009: 44) says, “what they do is identifiable as 
insurgent planning if it is purposeful actions that aim to disrupt 
domineering relationships of oppressors to the oppressed, and to 
destabilize such a status quo through consciousness of the past and 
imagination of an alternative future.” What is unprecedented in 
Venezuela and rare in the world is that the national government wants to 
support grassroots planning insurgencies against oppression. The 
practices that unfold, however, are replete with procedural and 
ideological challenges. Below we discuss how these considerations play 
out in two concrete planning cases.  
 
REFLECTIONS FROM THE TRENCHES: ACADEMIC 
INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY ACTIVISM  
This section discusses two experiences of direct involvement by one of 
the authors and other academics in community activism in Caracas. The 
first refers to involvement in strengthening popular movements in their 
efforts to improve their local living conditions in the context of support 
for/from the current Venezuelan Constitution and political regime. The 
second involves participation in a local community organizational effort 
in accordance with the responsibilities assigned to communities by the 
constitution and subsequent legislation regulating community 
involvement in local planning activities.  
 
POPULAR EDUCATION AT THE CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF 
VENEZUELA  
In the first case, a group of professors from different disciplines 
(architects, planners, historians, biologists, and chemists) from the 
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Central University of Venezuela sustained a dialogue with a number of 
community representatives during three semesters in 2002–2004 about 
these leaders’ experiences in community organizing in relation to 
government decision makers. The academics engaged in this dialogue in 
the spirit of Donald Schön’s Reflective Practitioner (1983; 1987; 1991), 
Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972) and Pedagogy of 
Freedom (1998), bell hooks’s Teaching to Transgress (1994) and 
Teaching Community (2003), and action research (González et al., 
2007). We were open-minded to the idea of learning in partnership with 
the community and contributing to community development and 
empowerment.  
 
At the initiative of the university’s School of Modern Languages, we got 
together to structure a course that would have practical use for 
community activists. The course was offered free of charge and was 
open to all, irrespective of formal educational level. Although there were 
a number of university graduates and schoolteachers among the 
participants, most of those involved lived in low-income, self-built 
barrios or public housing projects. The initiative was an attempt to 
validate, reflect on, and learn from the experience of local activists from 
various communities and facilitate networking opportunities. It took 
place before the consolidation of the local planning councils in the 
country, but was guided by the desire to build upon the political project 
defined in the new national constitution. It was a difficult period in the 
country, following the April 2002 coup d’état and the 2002–2003 oil 
industry stoppage, and marked by the feverish communal activities that 
accompanied the start of the social missions led by the government, 
particularly Robinson (the literacy campaign), Barrio Adentro (primary 
health care in informalsettlements), and Mercal (popular markets of 
basic food products at subsidized prices). The ability of the participants 
to attend class sessions was affected by these events in that many were 
quickly absorbed into these programs and those that followed. As a 
result, the number of participants fell by more than half to a final group 
of 16.  
 
The experience started with a formal course in project evaluation and 
planning aimed at obtaining financing from government agencies and a 
course in the ideological roots of the Bolivarian Revolution (the 
philosophies of Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and Ezequiel Zamora) 
that attempted to articulate popular knowledge and that obtained through 
mass-circulation journals with the more formal analysis of academic 
essays and historical documents. In both courses formal and 
prestructured knowledge and pedagogic strategies proved not very 
  18 
useful because they were not sensitive to the experiences of the group 
and the sophistication of individual participants, who had already 
learned very valuable lessons though their varied experiences of 
community work. Less formally organized encounters proved more 
conducive to learning in allowing exchanges about and reflections on 
lived experiences.  
 
At the end of each semester, the groups evaluated their performance and 
decided on the two courses in which they would like to participate in the 
following semester. Each semester there was one course directly 
relevant to planning issues and another on contextual elements (e.g., the 
constitution and the government missions). In the planning course we 
tried to clarify through participants’ experiences the differences between 
the stages of the planning processes in which they had already been 
involved. It became clear that linear processes were not appropriate 
(something that planners usually acknowledge but tend to reproduce) 
because some communities already had their priorities established or had 
determined what projects they considered essential. It made no sense to 
pretend that we were faced with a clean slate. We tried to associate the 
planning processes with issues related to the organization of the 
communities, convinced that the most important result was not 
achieving specific plan objectives but strengthening local community 
organizations and guaranteeing their permanence—building and 
sustaining social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995; Booher and 
Innes, 2002) and contributing to community-driven development 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Beard and Dasgupta, 2006).  
 
Participants considered the experience productive. The contact with the 
university had given them confidence to defend their positions in 
negotiations with other institutional actors, and meeting other 
community activists had given them “network power”—”power that 
grows as it is shared and is not a zero-sum game” (Innes, 2004: 13; 
Irazábal, 2009). Power grew as players built on their interdependencies 
(Booher and Innes, 2002). To provide continuity to the experience, we 
decided to establish discussion forums in the neighborhoods, thus 
acknowledging their lived place, validating their experience, and 
incorporating more local people into the dialogue. 
 
The establishment of networks, the empowerment of the participants, 
and the learning we experienced were the most positive results of the 
project. We noted, however, that there was a tendency for community 
leaders to be absorbed by government institutions, including the 
missions, municipal bureaucratic positions, and political party activity. 
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Co-opted by the state, some ceased to act as representatives of their 
communities (Havassy and Yanay, 1990). At the same time, academic 
demands made it challenging for the professors to reach out and achieve 
continuity. As a result, two years after the start of this experience our 
communication with participants had virtually ceased. These challenges 
reveal the difficulties of becoming “reflective practitioners” (Schön, 
1983)—individuals striving to strike a balance between their 
commitment to knowledge and action.  
 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN SAN PEDRO PARISH  
The second experience took place in San Pedro Parish in Caracas, 
adjacent to the Central University of Venezuela, in the period 2002–
2006. This parish has a large population of lower-middle-class people 
who depend on state-financed services. A community/university 
network was initiated by a group of professionals in the university’s 
School of Architecture and Urbanism in 2003, and other professors 
joined in 2004. The organization of local planning councils was a central 
part of the experience. Parallel to the institutional processes, a constant 
effort was made to document all the experiences of the community with 
the aim of developing an ongoing “diagnosis” of the parish that included 
basic information on the community and on the projects that the 
members brought to the working group.  
 
The activity proved to be a rich and varied experience. Weekly meetings 
with a core group of local activists at the School of Architecture and 
Urbanism were often joined by others depending on the type of project 
or problem (e.g., homelessness, street vending, security in public spaces) 
being discussed, including university students working with the 
community and people from other communities. We also participated 
with the community in local assemblies, social events, and neighborhood 
meetings involving state actors. The community was able to identify its 
principal problems, determine priorities for intervention, and present its 
ideas to the relevant authorities. The community/university network 
offered assistance to community actors in the formal expression of these 
ideas, such as the elaboration of maps and written documents, and 
multimedia PowerPoint presentations were produced to facilitate sharing 
of the proposals.  
 
The local activists often displayed a broader understanding of problems 
and project proposals than the government institutions involved, 
especially at the municipal level. One example was related to the 
problem of security. The activists understood that it was very difficult to 
intervene directly in the organization of the police forces with 
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responsibilities in the parish. They did, however, feel that street lighting, 
tree pruning, and maintenance of public spaces could have a positive 
impact on public safety. The authorities tended to respond to initiatives 
in this regard with formal and isolated interventions such as the 
replacement of the lighting fixtures. The activists, however, knew that 
this approach did little to resolve the problem. They recognized that the 
challenges of homelessness, poor maintenance of public spaces and 
vegetation, street vending, inadequate lighting, and lack of formal police 
patrols required multifaceted intervention. Additionally, they understood 
the importance of their own role, for instance, in generating cultural 
activities in open spaces, exercising visual control from the adjacent 
buildings, and involving local business owners in stimulating activities 
in the surrounding spaces (e.g., street-side cafes and controlled street 
vending). In sum, community members offered planners and 
functionaries valuable information and lessons.  
 
Another example is related to the homeless. In the context of the 
constitution’s call for social solidarity (Art. 2), the traditional repressive 
measures taken against street people were considered inappropriate by 
community members. Instead, some local community actors took the 
initiative of seeking ways to improve life conditions for these people. In 
collaboration with a group of psychology students and homeless people, 
they developed a project offering various services to street people. What 
we want to highlight here is not so much the content of this project as 
the fact that the initiative (underpinned and inspired by the philosophy of 
the new constitution and the regime) emerged from the community and 
the inclusion of homeless people. While the community group was 
working on this project, however, a new government mission called 
Negra Hipólita (the name of Simón Bolívar’s childhood caregiver) was 
introduced by the government to confront this same problem at the 
national and city levels. Although the achievements of this mission have 
been significant,
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it robbed local initiatives such as the one in San Pedro 
Parish of institutional and financial resources.  
 
SOME RISKS OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE FOR 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZING  
Just as centralized, government-led missions can compete with and ulti-
mately dampen local initiatives, the creation of local community 
organizations can stymie emergent social movement organizations with 
novel approaches to organizing or forms of problem-solving at the local 
level. The formation of local planning councils is illustrative of the 
problem—along with, perhaps, the benefits—of the top-down imposition 
of organizational forms. These councils were intended to function as a 
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counterweight to municipal control of local decision making. Despite the 
fact that noninstitutional actors have the majority of the votes on these 
councils, in the case of the Libertador Municipality in Caracas—to 
which San Pedro Parish belongs— the mayor maintained control over 
decision making and simply bypassed the council. The San Pedro 
council representative felt pressured into agreeing to decisions in which 
he had not had the opportunity to participate. To complicate things 
further, his work and that of other participants was unpaid while the 
institutionally elected members, such as the mayor, received salaries.  
 
The issue of compensation for participation extended beyond this 
inequity. Community participants who helped construct public works 
were unpaid while contractors were paid for equivalent work. 
Furthermore, significant time commitments were expected of 
participants in councils, and no reduction of laborers’ time has yet been 
provided in compensation.
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On the contrary, some employers opposed 
to Chávez either kept their employees at work extra time to prevent them 
from participating in government-sponsored initiatives or explicitly 
requested them not to do so.  
 
In recognition of the limitations of the local planning council, especially 
in the larger cities, communal councils were formed to permit the direct 
financing by the national government of local actions. Many institutional 
actors have been involved in this process. This involvement is 
sometimes confusing to local groups, which must decide on the spatial 
delimitation of the parish, their own priorities, and ways of designating 
or electing their representatives. The intervention of institutional actors, 
particularly from the government, could be considered as an effort to 
maintain influence over the communal councils, but there is no doubt 
that at this stage some guidance is essential. Additionally, it can be 
argued that a certain degree of confusion in the process is inevitable. 
What is clear is that, despite the confusion, these innovations have 
encouraged communities to participate in the process of self-organiza-
tion and planning.  
 
In San Pedro Parish, local activists were often critical of the imposition 
of representatives of the governing political parties on local 
organizations and the co-optation of activists by state institutions. We 
could interpret some of these problems as frictions that occur between 
the structures created by representative democracy, with its 
predominantly individualistic ethic (dominant for the 40 years of the 
previous regime in Venezuela), and the emerging more direct 
democracy, with its attempt to promote solidarity and consolidation of 
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communities’ power. The frequent changes in legislation and the 
differing interpretations of it by multiple agents (including within the 
university) reflect a tension between the idea that legislation ought to 
lead processes and the idea that it ought to respond to the initiatives of 
organized groups. A similar conflict is that between a view of the 
communal councils as the base of a political pyramid, with the 
municipal, state, and national levels of government on top, and the belief 
that the councils should completely replace city and state governments.  
 
Because communal councils send their project proposals directly to the 
Presidential Commission of Popular Power, critics of the government 
see the bypassing of the intermediate levels of government as a risky 
return to centralization and “presidentialism.” They also argue that while 
some councils suppress dissent and are therefore assumed to be pro-
Chávez, councils led by the opposition usually have a harder time 
getting funding (Martín, 2007). Lastly, if legislation is complied with 
and the vote of the majority in councils is respected, some decisions and 
policies that are not in the public interest (e.g., traditional “not in my 
back yard” decisions such as preventing the construction of working-
class housing in affluent neighborhoods) may be implemented, 
reproducing the persistent dilemma between democracy and equity in 
urban planning processes.  
 
Despite these limitations, in the case of San Pedro Parish, local activists 
maintained their enthusiasm and were optimistic regarding the 
possibility of formal consolidation of their communal councils in the 
short term. At the national level, the communal council project has 
generated a great deal of enthusiasm and participation because it is 
perceived as opening an alternative channel of communication with and 
assistance from the government that is less dependent on the municipal 
authorities or political parties, which are often viewed in a negative 
light. Many communities also appreciate the fact that communal 
councils open a direct conduit to President Chávez, who maintains 
constant contact with grassroot groups throughout the country. 
Notwithstanding the danger of overestimating the figure of the 
president-leader in this process of political transition, many supporters 
of the government feel that their direct access to and support from 
Chávez can help them bypass bureaucratic stalling and possible sabotage 
and in the process contribute to community empowerment.  
 
FINAL THOUGHTS  
Two main themes emerge from this discussion of the ongoing 
Venezuelan political transition. The first is the difficulty of transferring 
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power to the people even within a national political regime that 
discursively identifies with grassroots participation. There are many 
challenges inherent in a political transition that has adopted the 
bureaucratic state apparatus of a previous regime and experiences the 
tensions derived from the parallel functioning of representative and 
direct institutions—including longer and more cumbersome processes of 
decision making, lack of procedural and factual certainties, and changing 
regulations and organizational structures as the system moves from 
representative to more direct democracy. Additionally, while direct 
democracy may easily function at the local level, it is much more 
challenging to implement it at other levels of decision making.  
 
Similar challenges are inevitable in planning. Our experience indicates 
that, in this period of transition, planning decisions remain mostly 
hierarchical. Furthermore, national and regional planning tends to be 
dominated by technical approaches, whereas local participatory planning 
tends to be more pragmatic and problem-oriented. In this context, there 
is a need to unravel what happens when the two systems meet and devise 
ways to achieve greater citizen participation at the national and regional 
levels. This calls for a delicate balance between preventing local 
processes from negating constructive input from upper levels of 
government and protecting them from overbearing control. Unequal 
power relations among planning stakeholders (see Foucault, 1977 
[1972]; Forester, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998) require local groups to be wary 
of the usurpation of their power by the municipal authorities or the 
national political parties in a situation in which there is still ambiguity 
regarding how the new planning structure ought to function.  
 
In these circumstances, there is great need for planners willing to help 
develop and expand alliances with locally organized people’s power. 
Most professional planners in Venezuela have been trained in the 
rational paradigm, and many operate under the assumptions that 
planning processes can be controlled and predetermined, that planners 
should lead and coordinate decision-making processes, and that they 
should be given time for thorough evaluation of proposals before 
recommending a course of action. As in other contexts, they are often 
afraid of taking risks, experimenting, or taking popular reasoning into 
account (Carp, 2004; Sandercock, 2005; 2006). Facing these challenges, 
planners have to be constantly aware of their entrenched structures of 
power that perpetuate hegemonic ways of thinking and reasoning 
(Healey, 1997: 93; Harvey, 1985; Kaza, 2006) and try to eliminate the 
obstacles to the consolidation of people’s power.  
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Academic planners sympathetic to this call can ally themselves with 
communities in their search for empowerment and self-determination. It 
is possible to become organic intellectuals. While ideally these 
intellectuals come from and remain with the working class, they can also 
be scholars with strong roots in their communities, who work to 
maintain links with local issues and struggles and use their position to 
help those communities to develop self-inspired, organic consciousness. 
Beyond this, there are opportunities for planners to work empathetically 
in communities that are not their own. To do so they will need 
experience of and openness to various approaches so that, instead of 
imposing a preferred method, they can seek the one that seems most 
appropriate for the particular community. They will also need empathy, 
sensitivity, respect for the opinions of others, affection, enthusiasm, 
reflexivity, and tolerance (Freire, 1972; hooks, 2003). This proposal is 
reminiscent of Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994: 2) idea of the qualitative 
researcher as a bricoleur, a person capable of producing “a pieced-
together, close-knit set of practices that provides solutions to a problem 
in concrete situations . . . and takes new forms as different tools, 
methods and techniques are added to the puzzle.” These radical planners 
will draw their tools from “what is available in the context” and will be 
capable of “performing a large range of diverse tasks” and 
“knowledgeable about the many interpretive paradigms . . . that can be 
brought to any particular problem.” They will sometimes need to support 
community decisions even in the face of uncertainty, since an 
opportunity can easily be lost and and not acting may hinder progress in 
the transition toward a more equitable and participatory democracy. In a 
transitional period like that of today, with the process threatened by 
domestic and international opposition (Clement, 2005; Sharma, Tracy, 
and Kumar, 2004; Zagorski, 2003), conservatism or dogmatism on the 
part of planning practitioners and scholars can work against the 
consolidation of people’s power.  
 
We support Miraftab’s (2009: 33) call for an insurgent planning rooted 
in the particularities of the so-called global South, one that promotes 
practices that are “counter-hegemonic in that they destabilize the 
normalized order of things; [that] transgress time and place by locating 
historical memory and transnational consciousness at the heart of their 
practices [and] are imaginative in promoting the concept of a different 
world as . . . both possible and necessary.” The development of the 
practical and theoretical implications of radical planning on the basis of 
reflections on experiences from the global South will contribute to a 
“decolonization of planning theory” (Miraftab, 2009: 32) by 
“questioning the assumption that every plan and policy must insist on 
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modernization,” with the Western city as an object of desire (45; Perera, 
1999; Irazábal, 2004). The case of Venezuela is particularly valuable for 
this exploration because grassroots planning challenges to neoliberal 
capitalism are supported from above. The Venezuelan experience can 
therefore provide both hope and inspiration and cautionary lessons to 
community members, planning scholars and practitioners, and 
government officials throughout the continent and beyond.  
 
NOTES  
1. In the 1980s, many neighborhood associations were created in 
Venezuela, although most Venezuelans did not participate in them. 
These associations made plans and presented proposals to the 
government but had neither binding powers nor public funding. 
Middle- and upper-income neighborhood associations organized 
themselves in federations such as the Federación de Asociaciones de 
Comunidades Urbanas and the Escuela de Vecinos in Caracas, but 
the lower-income associations were excluded. The latter mainly 
engaged in self-help projects and confrontational politics with the 
government.  
2. It is usual to date the Constitution to 1999, the year it was finished 
by the National Assembly and passed by the voters, but it was 
officially published in Gaceta in 2000.  
3. “Planning” is defined here as the creation of strategies for the 
betterment of places and communities through social, community, 
and economic development, land use, housing, urban design and 
preservation, mobility, and environmental planning. Planning can 
take place at different scales, from the local to the global. At the core 
of planning is interest in furthering the public good and creating a 
more equitable future for all. In the context of Venezuelan 
communal councils, the specified areas of work include health, 
education, land use, housing, habitat, social protection and equality, 
popular economy, culture, integral safety, communication and 
information, recreation and sports, food security, water, energy and 
gas, and services.  
4. Rational planning follows a technocratic, top-down, and supposedly 
value-neutral decision-making model in which “expert” planners 
participate. It aims to operate scientifically, attempting to gather all 
the relevant information, perform all the relevant analyses, develop 
all the potential solutions to a problem, and exhaustively evaluate 
their consequences before making a decision. In a changing world 
where planning is political and uncertainty and unpredictability 
abound, this mode of planning is neither economically nor politically 
feasible (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996), yet it is traditionally 
  26 
embraced in many parts of the world. However, the experiences in 
Venezuela reflected upon in this article further validates the notion 
that “[r]edressing the shortcomings of the traditional approach does 
not entail the discarding of the technocratic approach it espouses, but 
the acknowledgment that this situated knowledge is one of many 
socially constructed perspectives” (Irazábal, 2009: 130). Therefore 
planners’ knowledge and interests need to be acknowledged and 
counterbalanced by those of other stakeholders.  
5. We distinguish here the authoritarian past communist regimes of 
countries such as the USSR, China, and Cambodia from current 
socialist-oriented nations like the Scandinavian countries and from 
socialist-type practices such as the national health care system in 
Canada and Spain.  
6. A renewed optimism is cautiously arising given the structural crisis 
made manifest by the world financial crisis in 2008.  
7. The insurrectional strategies called guarimbas were employed in 
Caracas and some other Venezuelan cities. Their aim was to disrupt 
public order so as to provoke repressive military intervention, 
delegitimize the government, and encourage international action. 
The main strategy was to barricade major streets and freeways. In 
extreme forms, guarimba tactics included burning tires and trash in 
public streets, using homemade explosives and weapons such as 
Molotov cocktails, and most important, the para-policing and 
support of leaders, elected officials, and private media of the 
political opposition. After a few incidents, calls for massive par-
ticipation in guarimbas failed. The approach underestimated both the 
support for Chávez and the democratic culture of many Venezuelans, 
including many from the opposition. Significantly, also, the 
guarimbas were extremely unpopular because they infringed on the 
free movement of everyone in the city, particularly those in middle- 
and upper-middle-class neighborhoods (García-Guadilla, 2005).  
8. Scotto was elected mayor of Ciudad Guayana for the third time in 
2004.  
9. Before Chávez assumed the presidency, Causa R had split into two 
groups, one including the future minister of education and sports, 
Aristóbulo Istúriz, and the mayor of Ciudad Guayana (Municipio 
Caroní), Clemente Scotto, supporting Chávez; and the other 
opposing him and even participating in the coup d’état of 2002.  
10. Social spending in Venezuela (including social security) in 1990 
amounted to 172,271.3 million bolívares, 29.9 percent of public 
spending and 7.8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 
whereas in 2005 it was 38,781,871.5 million bolívares, 44.9 percent 
of public spending and 13.2 percent of GDP (SISOV, 2006). The 
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government’s proposed 2006 budget earmarked 41 percent of total 
expenditures or US$16.6 billion (£9.4 billion) for social programs. 
Both Anna Lucia d’Emilio, the director of the United Nations 
Children’s Fund in Venezuela, and Ramón Mayorga, the 
representative of the Inter-American Development Bank, considered 
the country’s social programs the largest and most comprehensive in 
Latin America (Monahan, 2005). It is fair to acknowledge here that 
in the intense political war between representative officials 
(governors and mayors) supporting and opposing Chávez’s regime, 
the state and municipalities whose governors and mayors have been 
politically opposed to the regime have had difficulty receiving their 
fair share of federal revenue.  
11. Administratively, the communal councils are represented in the 
parish councils, which in turn have representation in the local 
planning councils. In practice, these three organizations have varying 
levels of consolidation and interaction.  
12. According to the law, communal councils were meant to remain 
dependent on the municipal authorities. This disposition was 
subsequently revoked by the 2006 law Ley de los Consejos 
Comunales.  
13. For Ellner (2008) this corresponds to a “hard-line” Chavista strategy 
of creating parallel structures to replace old ones as opposed to the 
“soft-line” strategy of working with the old structures.  
14. The book was translated from English into Spanish by the 
Venezuelan Planning Institute in 2002 and became popular among 
planners in Venezuela.  
15. Many of these conditions have been more broadly identified as 
challenges to communicative planning (see Irazábal, 2009).  
16. Several national cooperatives and endogenous communities have 
been created that are practicing socialist models of grassroots 
economic development. The national government promotes foreign 
exchanges of preferentially priced Venezuelan oil for Cuban medical 
services in low-income areas under the mission called Barrio 
Adentro. Raising significant controversy in the United States, the 
Venezuelan government has also delivered help in the form of 
preferentially priced Venezuelan oil derivatives to poor and minority 
communities on the nation’s East Coast and in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina. For commentary on a Venezuelan-UK exchange 
of oil for planning consulting, see Massey (2007).  
17. For example, in the reaction to the coup d’état of April 2002, when 
the low-income supporters of Chávez’s government directly 
confronted the city police force in the streets, the majority of the 
middle-class supporters of Chávez’s government remained at home, 
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fearful of repression by the coup executors.  
18. According to government accounts, the mission has 43 centers. In 
the first six months of 2008, more than 2,600 people received 
services, along with 198 people who were reinserted after 
rehabilitation (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2008).  
19. A proposal for a reduction of the workday was included in a 
constitutional reform that was narrowly rejected (by less than 2 
percent of the votes) in December 2007.  
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